

Movement towards monetary union should proceed cautiously and joining the Euro should remain optional.

Entry to the EU does not mean immediate membership in the currency union, although due to the present treaty arrangements it is requisite in the long-term. Turkey does not meet any of the Maastricht criteria, though progress in monetary stabilisation, which could continue in the coming years, can be noted. In this respect, many transformation countries had similar experiences at the outset of the accession process.

The fundamental question, however, is whether in such a heterogeneous economic area it is sensible to demand that Turkey (as a current *acquis* obligation) pursues a rapid fulfilment of the Maastricht criteria and participation in EMU. The advantage of a faster linkage to or acceptance of the Euro is the import of credibility that would result. Interest rates would sink and higher FDI (a weak point in Turkish development) would be attracted. Admittedly, transition countries have higher inflation rates because of structural adaptation processes. Balanced against this, an orientation to the Maastricht criteria too early could lead to a restrictive monetary and fiscal policy with negative consequences for the Turkish economy. The EU would be well advised to refrain from forcing an integration of Turkey into EMU or alternatively enable a medium and long-term 'opting-out' mechanism.

Table 19: **Compliance with the Maastricht Criteria**

	Long-term interest rates in percent ¹	Inflation in percent ²	Fiscal balance as percent of GDP ³	Public debt as percent of GDP ³	Currency exchange rate regime
Maastricht Criteria					
	Ref. (7.5) ⁵	Ref. (2.0) ⁵	-3.0	60.0	EMS-II System ⁴ /Deviation from parity: plus or minus 15%
Euro zone 2003 (estimates)					
	4.1 Ref. (6.3) ⁶	2.1 Ref. (2.5) ⁶	-2.7	70.6	Three steps to Currency Union, starting 1 Jan. 1999 fixed exchange rate; Jan. 2002 introduction of the euro as cash
Candidates					
Bulgaria	4.5	2.3	0	53.7	Currency Board (Euro)
Romania	18.2	15.3	-2.3	26.3	Managed Float (US\$)
Turkey	42.8 shc	25.3	-8.8	87.4	Float
Group Averages					
NMCs ⁸	5.5	2.9	-4.5	39.9	Different exchange rate regimes: Currency Board (Estonia), Crawling peg (Hungary) to Managed Float (Slovenia)
Candidate-2 ⁸	11.4	15.3	-2.3	40.0	Currency Board (Bulgaria); Managed Float Romania (USD)
EU-South 1990 ⁸	15.0	10.2	-8.3	75.6	EMS (European Monetary System)
EU-South 2003 ⁸	4.4 ⁷	3.2	-1.9	71.0	Euro

¹ For the euro zone and, if available, for the NMCs, interest rates for ten-year state bonds; shorter maturities taken for Estonia. ² Harmonised consumer goods price index. ³ Definitions might differ from those of the EU. ⁴ EMS: European Monetary System. ⁵ For interest rates, maximum of two percentage points above the best performers; for inflation, maximum of 1.5 percentage points above the best performers; reference values during the euro introduction (beginning 1999). ⁶ Reference values for 2003. ⁷ December 2003; ⁸ Unweighted averages. Sources: European Central Bank, Deutsche Bundesbank; Gros (2000)

9. From 'Privileged Partnership' to 'Extended Associate Membership'

In view of the vast geographic extension that accompanied its most recent increase in membership, the question of where the EU's borders actually lie has intensified. In early 2003 the Commission developed a strategy termed 'Wider Europe' involving the proposed construction of a 'Ring of Friends', that is, around the EU (Lippert 2004). Javier Solana reprised this at the Thessaloniki summit with the formulation: a 'ring of well-governed countries...with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations' (Commission 2003a; Batt et. al. 2003). This strategy coincides with an emergent ambivalence about the EU's purpose, ambitions and capacities, an ambivalence that can be expected to intensify. In cooperation with the 'EU-Outs', the 'Wider Europe' strategy proposes to form concentric circles of differentiated integration, which in the economic field could include an extended European Economic Area (EEA), free trade, customs union, and unified standards and norms. Differentiation is the operative principle: the relationship of neighbouring states will be 'tailored' to each specific case.

Implicitly, this strategy involves the drawing up of the EU's borders. In the framework of this concept, countries below the threshold of EU membership (such as Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and those of the Maghreb) will be associated in a differentiated form. They are distinguished from others (Balkans, Turkey) towards whom the EU has taken on special obligations. Taking the very variable situations and problems into account, a flexible, differentiated strategy is required. Simultaneously the question 'what stage of integration should these countries terminate at?' is justifiable. For several of them (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus), full membership is neither a reliable 'European anchor' nor a realistic objective in the foreseeable future. These countries are far from fulfilling any requirements to even to start negotiations. For others, like Turkey, the EU may not be prepared to cope with their membership. Turkey may be the first case for which the EU develops a special relationship that could also serve as a flexibly interpreted model for other 'strategic partners'.

9.1. The Rapid Commencement of Entry Negotiations is Risky

The beginning of entry negotiations with Turkey sooner rather than later comes with major risks attached. Previous experiences cause serious doubts about the EU's reform capacity and the magnitude required could plunge the EU into a deep crisis that paralyses it for years. This may occur if the new constitutional treaty is rejected by a single national parliament or in a referendum. A Turkish entry would then be pushed further back and stimulate another round of bitter disappointment. Various transition periods and exceptions to the rules (restrictions on free movement of people, delayed integration into disbursement programs) can also be expected. This raises the question of just how advantageous, in the short and medium-term, a perspective of full membership for Turkey would actually be.

Weighed against this, a EU perspective for Turkey would increase Europe's credibility in a country that has had associate status for many decades. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the nature of the promise given to Turkey in 1963, in the middle of the Cold War and concerning participation in a customs and economic union, is to be evaluated differently than the decision at the Helsinki summit in 1999 (candidate status for membership of the *European Union*). According to witnesses, this 'historic' decision on the future configuration of Europe was made in three minutes. A public debate on the external borders of Europe was avoided. This

perfunctory action by the heads of state and government compelled the EU to enter into a qualitatively different negotiation agenda with Turkey.

Box 1: Extended Associated Membership (EAM)

The concept of an 'Extended Associated Membership' builds on and clarifies that of a 'privileged partnership'. It offers targeted countries a clear and attractive alternative. EAM includes:

- Full participation in an 'Extended European Economic Area' (EEEEA) based on the existing EEA (see Box 2). This means incorporation into the internal market with all regulations applying. Certain specific sectors might be excluded. Labour market access would be restricted and specially tailored treaty clauses would be negotiated.
- The institutional setting and co-ordinating mechanism the EAM extends that of the EEA (see figures 6, 7). A special council for EDSP coordination has to be established.
- Participation in EU Council meetings with opportunity to present positions. Voting rights would not apply.
- EAM goes beyond the EEA-concept as it also represents a custom union. EAM-members have the right of consultation in EU's negotiation positions in trade negotiations.
- Support programs principally in the structural and cohesion policy area (including rural development). Agriculture (CAP) would be excluded.
- Participation in EU Council meetings with opportunity to present positions. Voting rights would not apply.
- A special senate of the European Court of Justice would decide on treaty transgressions and other legal matters falling within areas agreed in the EAM.

EAM presumes a clear definition of Europe's (and the EU's) borders. This could involve reference to cultural, geographic, or 'consolidation phase necessary' justifications (or a combination of them).

- In the first case the declaration in Article 49 of the EU-Treaty that 'any European state can apply for membership in the EU' would have a cultural interpretation with which Turkey does not correspond.
- In the second case a geographic criterion would be applied. Over 95 % of Turkish territory lies in Asia. This would rule out Turkey from membership as it would North Africa, Israel and other extra-European states with which the EU has some form of special relationship.
- The third case envisages a pragmatic decision based on the need to avoid an over-extension and meltdown of the EU's capacities (which would not help anyone) and instead to concentrate on consolidation measures. This would have the effect of postponing any possible Turkish EU entry far into the future. For the same reason Russia's full EU-membership as a quasi-European state would be ruled out. For all countries mentioned above the EAM would be the final integration level.

If a clear definition of Europe's borders is avoided then a more flexible approach could be applied. In this case EAM could be alternatively considered as a final or transitional integration level. In any instance it would be obligatory before full membership could ensue.

Yet it may also spark a different credibility crisis. Immediately upon the commencement of negotiations, discussion on the membership of other neighbouring states, with which the EU already has special relations, would intensify. The Rome Treaty's Article 49 can be noted here: 'Any European state can apply for membership of the EU'. This was declared without having defined what a 'European state' is or what it is not (Cf. Arnold 2004: 138-147). The EU cannot withdraw from the obligations it has created for itself or, for example, from the

central security task of pacifying the Balkans. If Turkey is admitted, how could the EU refuse Ukraine a membership perspective should it successfully fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria?

Firstly, a cultural interpretation of Article 49 could ensue in which it was determined that Turkey was not a 'European' state. Secondly, a geographic reasoning could be applied in order to exclude Turkey (or Russia).⁸ About 95% of Turkish territory lies outside most currently accepted geographic definitions of Europe. A rejection of North African states – should they introduce the requisite democratic reforms and apply to join – by reference to geography would then be relatively uncomplicated. After a Turkish entry, however, this would be harder to justify. For countries like Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus this argument cannot be made. An entry of these some time in the future would also be in the foreign policy interests of the new EU members in CEE.

9.2. 'Privileged Partnership' and 'Extended Associated Membership' as a Integration Alternatives

The proponents of a full membership for Turkey warn of the danger that may result from a Turkish 'refusal-shock'. The danger is exaggerated as it is in Turkey's interest to maintain a close relationship with the EU and in the continuation of internal reforms. Turkey needs a European perspective but it must not necessarily be one that promises full membership.

To avoid a spatial and institutional-organisational overstretch, the EU could offer Turkey and other strategic partners a Privileged Partnership (zu Guttenberg 2004), such as proposed by the Christian Democratic parties (CDU/CSU), and also preferred by some prominent Social Democrats in Germany, or an 'Extended Associated Membership' (EAM). This presumes a clear definition and confirmation of the EU's borders. Alternatively the EU's heads of state and government could make the fundamental decision to introduce a long consolidation phase in which no additional enlargements would be undertaken.

A Privileged Partnership would be phased in and eventually surpass the status of special relations (Partnership and Cooperation Agreements) and normal Associate Membership. Privileged Partnerships could be individually negotiated and include membership in the EEA as well as particular forms of intensive political dialogue (regular summit meetings). This concept's main advantage is its flexibility. A disadvantage is that it appears less clear and attractive than full EU membership and would presently be rejected as an alternative by the Turkish government.

9.3. EAM Should Provide for Partial Integration in EU Political Structures and Cohesion Policy

The EAM goes further and attempts to better define a privileged form of relations. In the economic sphere it includes membership in an 'Extended European Economic Area' (EEEE). This would mean a full expansion of the internal market (with competition rules) for all countries concerned. Free labour movement would remain restricted and regulated in special treaties, similarly to other 'sensitive' areas.

⁸A potential counter-argument could be made by reference to the fact that - geographically defined - about 80 % of Russians and about 33 % of Turks live in 'Europe'.

These countries would be participants in the EU internal market with all the preferences deriving from market access, unified competition rules and through factor mobility (with restrictions noted above for labour). The economic effects of the EAM are then in large part comparable with full membership. EMU is not initially foreseen but is not fundamentally excluded. Participation in the internal market means that these countries would take on most of the *acquis* and must fulfil the already requisite economic criteria.

Extensive economic integration must be flanked by a partial integration in political structures and special cohesion programs. Only in this way would the EAM be a credible and attractive alternative to full membership. Acceptance of the *acquis* brings a wide range of obligations (and associated costs), which must be offset by equivalents in the political and financial areas. Partial political integration could follow in the context of enlarged EU Council meetings in which 'wider Europe' would decide on pan-European issues. This would not extend to voting rights but would include rights to present opinions and proposals. Defining the areas of competence for the enlarged EU Council would be difficult but not impossible. The institutional setting and political coordination scheme could follow those of the EEA (see BOX 2) but could be extended to include an intensified political dialogue and the ESDP (see figures 6 and 7). EAM countries would also have personnel employed in the European institutions, principally the Commission. This would be compatible with and assist the 'Wider Europe' strategy. Integration into EU policies would occur along with expanded support programs, before all through a newly configured cohesion policy. Participation in the CAP would be excluded and substituted by a focus on rural development.

Box 2: **The European Economic Area (EEA)**

The EEA came into force on the 1st of January 2004. It includes the former EFTA countries Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. In a referendum Switzerland rejected the EEA-membership in December 1992. The EEA forms a common market with the EU based on the *acquis*. The agreement encompasses an important difference to other international treaties in that 'common rules are continuously updated by adding new EC legislation. This aspect is essential given the large output of Community legislation on the internal market. Each month a number of EEA-relevant pieces of legislation are incorporated into EEA Agreement by decision of the EEA Joint Committee.' (EEA 2004). EFTA experts are incorporated in the decision-making process and have a right of consultation in issues concerning the EEA. This differentiates it from the EU's bilateral treaties with Switzerland. The CAP and fisheries are not included although some issues of trade policy in these areas are mentioned. Because the EEA is not a customs union it does not affect trade policy with other partners. The agreement goes beyond the 'four freedoms' of the internal market and covers areas like research and development, education, consumer safety, environment and social policy. The EFTA countries can participate in designated EU programs and can influence their development and management through participation in corresponding committees. The EEA could be characterised as a high-level free trade area that excludes participation in the political process of the EU. The case of Liechtenstein proves that flexible solutions can be found in several fields like the free movement of labour. Influence on the EU's internal market regulations is rather limited. Several institutions ensure a proper functioning of the EEA. These include a Joint Committee (responsible for current implementation); the EEA-Council (consisting of the foreign ministers of the EU and EFTA member states); a Joint Parliamentary Committee (MPs of all states); and an EEA Executive Committee (member of various committees of the EU). In addition several other regulatory organs are involved (current Committee of the EFTA-states with coordinating functions; EFTA-supervisory office; and a special court).

Figure 6: **Different EU-Integration Paths and Stages**





Figure 7: Institutional Framework of EU and EFTA/EMA Policy Co-ordination



9.4. Integration Alternatives Remain Topical

To the present Turkey has rejected any integration alternatives. This is rational in the sense of aiming to realise maximum positions. Although there are signals that EU entry negotiations will commence fairly rapidly, a discussion of alternatives is sensible. The process is featured by an underlying fragility. It cannot be excluded that the political and economic imponderables of a Turkish membership might lead to a change of thinking in Turkish estimations. The conclusion may be drawn that EU membership demands too much in the way of adaptation costs and entails excessive loss of sovereignty. This would cause an entry perspective to be pushed far into the future.

There are also further political uncertainties. From official sources it is repeatedly emphasised that only the complete fulfilment of the Copenhagen Criteria and the adoption of the *acquis* will determine Turkey's acceptance or not. It must also be remembered that the acceptance of a country must be unanimously approved and ratified by every national parliament. Turkey's membership is disputed in the EU15 and it is presently open what positions will be adopted by the NMCs. Complex EU regulations may also be responsible for delays; so too political or economic crises in Turkey, as has often happened in the past. The Commission's proposal of a restricted approach reflects these fears.

9.5. Consolidation Before Enlargement

It is often forgotten that the Copenhagen Criteria also contain provisions requiring that the EU must be capable of enlargement. We do not know what the EU will look like in ten years. Gradual policy alterations and uncertainty about the discharging of the draft constitutional treaty stimulate doubts about whether the EU with up to 30 members can function effectively. A long consolidation phase is necessary cope with the eastern enlargement and to further develop important economic projects (internal market, EMU, Lisbon process). In the political area the new constitution (if it is adopted) must be tested in practice. Further reforms are required to overcome insufficient institutional structures, the democratic deficit, and the complicated treaty and regulatory domains. A division of competences must be clarified and thoroughgoing changes in agricultural and structural policies introduced in order to avoid financial and structural collapse. If this does not happen, negotiations with Turkey would be delayed and ultimately arrive at a 'membership second class' with limited integration in key EU policy areas. Because of the striking income difference the free movement of labour must in many instances be restricted by long and flexible transition rules.

On the other hand the EU is endangered by a retreat from the 'solidarity' principle of interest equalisation. Because financial redistribution is losing importance as the principal linkage in the European decision process, political compromises will be ever more difficult. Increasing economic heterogeneity will make a unified economic and monetary policy harder to attain and would entail different starting points for different groups of states. Conceptualising and conducting a CFSP will not be any simpler; a larger group of states with different preferences in this area now participate in its formulation. This is especially pertinent for Turkey, which borders on many conflict regions. There is a danger that different integration levels and shifting alliances will arise, which formally or informally draw variable decision-making mechanisms to themselves. In such a situation considerable technical, organisational, and be-

fore all political problems, are likely. As a result the EU would become a club of varied memberships, hardly different to the 'Extended Associate Membership'.

Table 20: **Necessary EU Reforms before Turkey can enter the Union**

Policy Areas	Policy reforms, actions and problems
Agriculture	Co-financing of direct income transfers for farmers; Commission concentrates on market supervision and competition
Cohesion Policy	Concentration of transfers to poorer member states; regional policy returned to the national level; Commission to monitor national policy approaches
Financing and expenditures	The budgetary system has to be transformed to become fair and transparent; the British rebate has to be abolished; a new mechanism for financial transfers has to be found
Internal Market	Regulations of the <i>acquis</i> have to be streamlined and simplified; free movement of labour has to be restricted
EMU	No automatic obligation to join the EMU
Lisbon Process	Coordinated action of major EU economies; Commission's role limited to organising the dialogue
EDSP	Better coordination needed ; enhanced cooperation extended; more funding required
Policy coordination	Different types of formal and informal policy coordination have to be developed according to different integration levels

In the face of such a scenario the question is posed whether the EU, as a strategic actor, can summon the strength necessary to make a quantum leap that would enable it to become a partner of the USA in global security. For German foreign policy, the idea of 'political union' (hidden behind the formulation 'Core Europe'), which was once a precondition for the sustainability of EMU, is now apparently being backed away from. If Europe wants to think 'global' or even 'continental', improve its competitiveness, and provide a major contribution to international security, then political and economic integration must be advanced. If not the EU will remain a looser 'union of states'. 'Size' alone does not equate with 'strength', neither internally nor when directed externally.

An accession process with Turkey, and possibly other states (Balkans, Ukraine, Moldavia), may as a consequence intensify endeavours by a core group of EU members oriented to strengthening political, economic and military cooperation. Expressed another way, the centrifugal forces of the European unification process (enlargement or 'widening') could give a powerful stimulus to a counter movement of important European countries to form a 'core Europe' focused on 'deepening' integration. The possibility of this occurring is present within the framework of the new constitutional treaty. If others were to block this 'core Europe' process, then new (intergovernmental) integration concepts would be pursued. Interstate coordination (bilateral/trilateral/quadrilateral) would increase and changing integration cores, variable according to national interests, would form. Not more, rather less security in Europe, could result.

Table 21: EU Integration Levels and Association Strategies

Integration Level and Target	Requirements	Economic Integration	Institutions and Politics	Financial Programs
PCAs Target: not defined; may end in EAA	Not necessary full market economy and democratic legal order according to EU-standards but should be approached; 'Copenhagen Criteria light'	Non-preferential treatment in trade Economic cooperation	Intermittent political dialogue Suspension clause	Tacis
FTAs (Associated Status) Target: not defined; may end in EAA	'Copenhagen Criteria light': legislation should be approximate to the that of the Internal Market	Preferential treatment in trade; should be extended to services	Committees, political and security dialog; cooperation in transport, energy; support for WTO-membership	Meda, MFA
SAAs (Associated Status) Vague target: full EU-Membership	Objective: Market Economy, Copenhagen Criteria; regional co-operation; monitoring	Free Trade, partial adoption of the <i>acquis</i>	Association and Stabilisation council; Committees on different issues; intermittent political dialogue	CARDS
Bilateral treaties (Switzerland) Target: not defined; short-term: association agreement; long-term: full EU-membership	Market economy; Democratic legal order; Partial adoption of EU legal norms	Partial integration in European Economic Area (EEA), Preferential Agreements, Schengen	Intermittent political dialogue, technical dialogue	Integration in some EU-programs; contributions to cohesion funds
EAA Target: not defined, may end in full EU-membership	Market Economy and Democracy	Internal Market: Four Freedoms: goods, capital, labour (restricted), services	Several special institutions (i.e. joint committee, councils, supervisory organisation, special court)	Partial Integration in EU-Policies; contributions to cohesion funds
Europe Agreement (associated status) Target: Full EU-Membership (no clear legal commitment)	Phased adoption of <i>acquis</i> and Copenhagen Criteria (democracy, human rights, market economy, competitiveness capacity); Monitoring Process	Preferential trade agreements; phased liberalisation up to free trade and capital mobility; free movement of labour excluded	Association Council; Accession Partnerships; Intensive regular political dialogue	Pre-entry assistance (e.g. PHARE, SAPARD, ISPA)
'Privileged Partnership' Target: Associate status extended to several areas – final stage	Market economy; democratic legal order; competitiveness capacity; selected areas of the <i>acquis</i>	Customs Union; selected areas of liberalisation in the field of services; labour excluded	Association Council extended; (sub-committees in several fields); Intensive regular political dialogue Close cooperation in ESDP	Individual support programs
Extended Associate Membership (Authors' proposal): Target: Final integration level but full membership not excluded	Realisation of the most parts of the <i>acquis</i> and Copenhagen Criteria, before membership monitoring process	EEA, custom union including internal market; free movement of labour excluded (but partial liberalisation possible); EMU optional	Participation in the decision-making structures of the EEA (Joint Committee). Partial integration in EU political structures; Intense cooperation in ESDP	Partial integration in EU structural and cohesion policies, payments into these funds
Full EU Membership	Realisation of <i>acquis</i> and Copenhagen Criteria Schengen obligations	Internal market EMU	Full rights of a member state; Schengen obligations CFSP, ESDP	Full integration in EU policies (possible transition periods)

Explanations: PCAs: Partnership and Cooperation Agreements for Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova; FTAs: Free Trade Agreements within the Barcelona-Process. They include Association Agreements with Southern Mediterranean and North-African Countries; SAAs: Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) ends in Agreement (SAA). Includes Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia; Associate Membership: Europe Agreements with Bulgaria and Romania. Association Agreement with Turkey since 1963. *Source:* Authors' conception

List of abbreviations

<i>acquis:</i>	Acquis Communautaire
AKP	Justice and Development Party
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CEE:	Central and Eastern Europe
CEECs	Central and East European Countries
CEES:	Common European Economic Space initiative (EU / Russia)
CFSP:	Common Foreign and Security Policy
DIS:	Direct Income Support
EAM:	Extended Associate Membership
EEEA:	‘Extended European Economic Area’
EBRD:	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EIB:	European Investment Bank
EMU:	European Monetary Union
EP:	European Parliament
ESDP:	EU European Security and Defense Policy
EU:	European Union
FDI:	Foreign Direct Investment
FEMIP:	Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership
FTA:	Free Trade Agreement
GCI:	Growth Competitiveness Index
GDP:	Gross Domestic Product
GNI:	Gross National Income
GNP	Gross National Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IFIs:	International Financial Institutions
IMF:	International Monetary Fund
INTERREG:	Inter-regional programme aiming to stimulate cooperation within the EU
JHA:	Justice and Home Affairs
Meda:	Community assistance programme for Mediterranean countries
MFA:	Macro-financial assistance
NDEP:	Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership
NIS:	Newly Independent States (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan)
NMCs:	New Member Countries
OECD:	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE:	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA:	Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
QMV	Qualified Majority Voting

Phare:	Pologne, Hongrie Aide a la Reconstruction économique (Assistance programme for the Central European candidate countries)
RTD:	Research and Technological Development
Tacis:	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
TENs:	Trans-European Networks
UN:	United Nations
WEF	World Economic Forum
WTO:	World Trade Organisation

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